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By dr roBerT Joseph*
The British Government seems to colonize in a very empirical way: there is no investigation of the laws, 
usages, and customs of the natives - no attempt made to suit any laws to their particular conditions: how 
they can expect to succeed is to me marvelous. — octavius Hadfield, 1847.1
i. inTroducTion
Prior to signing the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, law and order operated within the legal system of 
Aotearoa through tikanga Mäori with Mäori world views, values and customary laws and institu-
tions prevailing. In this respect, Mäori customary law or tikanga Mäori is correctly referred to as 
the ‘first law’ of Aotearoa-New Zealand.2 Following the Treaty, the legal system continued to ac-
knowledge and accommodate for Mäori customary laws and institutions in quite significant ways. 
Early statutory and case law examples acknowledged Mäori customary laws and institutions in 
pragmatic ways so that there appears to have been some genuine attempts to reconcile two differ-
ent world views and laws within the same geo-political space.
This article will discuss some of the historic and contemporary statutory and case law exam-
ples of a hybrid Mäori-British common law legal system in Aotearoa-New Zealand that signifi-
cantly acknowledges the first law – tikanga Mäori customary law.3 The article teases out how the 
current legal system is encouraging the integration and reconciliation of Mäori customary and 
English common law highlighting some of the significant challenges of this hybrid polyphylet-
ic jurisprudence. The article highlights the importance of customary law generally and tikanga 
Mäori customary law specifically then discusses some of the significant personal, professional 
and institutional challenges of incorporating tikanga Mäori customary law into the legal system. 
The author concludes with a proposed pragmatic solution to assist the Judiciary when deciding on 
cases involving tikanga Mäori customary law. 
* Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of Waikato, Ngäti Raukawa, Maniapoto, Tuwharetoa, Kahungunu, Ran-
gitäne, Ngäi Tahu and Pakeha. 
1 Hadfield MSS, Hadfield/Vennh, 18 May 1847. Cited in K Sinclair, The Origin of the Mäori Wars (1957) 107.
2 Ani Mikaere referred to tikanga Mäori as the ‘First Law’ of Aotearoa/New Zealand in A Mikaere ‘The Treaty of 
Waitangi and Recognition of Tikanga Mäori’ in M Belgrave, M Kawharu and D Williams, Waitangi Revisited: Per-
spectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (2005) 330.
3 The phrases Mäori customary laws and institutions, tikanga Mäori, tikanga Mäori customary law, Mäori values, 
Mäori usages, and a Mäori world view are used interchangeably throughout this article.
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ii. hisToric LegaL auThoriTy for recognising mäori cusTomary Law
A. Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights
one of the non-Mäori legal authorities for acknowledging tikanga Mäori customary law within the 
legal system of Aotearoa-New Zealand is the common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights. English 
common law presumes and recognises some continuity of the local Aboriginal law subsequent to 
British annexation.4 The elements of Aboriginal rights maintained were those that were not repug-
nant to common law and which did not interfere with or challenge the new sovereign.5 Specific 
rules of Aboriginal title under the ambit of Aboriginal rights provide for the continuity of tribal 
property rights which are common law rules establishing a type of legal pluralism.6 The continu-
ity of tribal title is defined by Mäori customary laws thereby acknowledging that Mäori Rangatira 
(leaders) retained a certain amount of legally recognised de jure power. 
De facto, such authority was exercised by the Rangatira after British sovereignty until the 
Crown was practically able to exercise what it had claimed as a matter of law.7 The situation 
meant that some, if not most Mäori communities, remained subject to their traditional values, cus-
tomary laws, usages, norms and institutions after the Treaty. The notion that some tribes should 
have remained subject to their de jure customary laws and institutions however, was firmly reject-
ed following the 1860s New Zealand War period. De facto, many Mäori continued to live within 
their tribal rohe (regions) where the Queen’s writ remained marginal and tikanga Mäori continued 
to apply unabated perhaps even as late as World War II.
Given that the doctrine of Aboriginal rights is defined by customary laws, it would appear that 
the ‘Indigenisation’ of the Aotearoa-New Zealand legal system to some extent can occur and has 
occurred triggered by the judiciary. Still, the New Zealand judiciary has not always reacted favour-
ably to Mäori and the extent to which Mäori custom can be recognised remains to be argued.8
4 The Case of Tanistry (1608) Davies 28 (K B); Memorandum (1722) 2 P Wms 75 (P.C); Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 
Cowp 204 (K.B).
5 P McHugh, ‘The Aboriginal Rights of the New Zealand Mäori at Common Law’ (Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Sydney 
Sussex College, Cambridge, 1987), 150.
6 Ibid 51.
7 The first Attorney-General William Swainson tried to argue that the Crown did not have sovereignty over those tribes 
who had not signed the Treaty of Waitangi or had done so with the imperfect knowledge of its consequences. Swain-
son / Shortland, 27 December 1842, Co 209/16: 487; Opinion of 13 July 1843, enclosure in Shortland / Stanley (No. 
2), 13 July 1843, Co 209/22: 245, 285-93.
8 The judiciary later rejected claims to common law Aboriginal title and the Treaty of Waitangi in Wi Parata v Bishop 
of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur. (N.S) S.C 79. The Court upheld the Wi Parata finding in Hohepa Wi Neera v Bishop 
of Wellington (1902) 21 NZLR 655, which policy shifted in 1986 when the judiciary consented to recognise claims to 
common law Aboriginal title such as tribal mana (authority) over sea fisheries according to their customary laws in 
Te Weehi v Regional Officer (1986) 6 NZAR 114 (H.C).
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B. Treaty of Waitangi 1840
In 1840, the Crown developed a Charter9 for the Colony of New Zealand with accompanying Roy-
al Instructions10 that reiterated the main features of the Charter and included direction that no law 
passed by the Legislative Council should diminish the prerogative powers of the Crown.11 Gover-
nor Hobson was instructed not to propose or assent to any ordinance that would result in Mäori 
being treated less favourably than Europeans. McHugh noted that the promise of te tino rangati-
ratanga (self-governance) in Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi included the continued viability 
of customary law where Mäori ‘offenders’ were concerned.12 ‘The chiefs thought simply that they 
were to retain their customary authority over and amongst their own people,’ he added.13
The Treaty of Waitangi moreover, affirmed Mäori customary law as the first law of Aotearoa-
New Zealand in the terms of Article II: ‘... te tino Rangatiratanga ... o ratou taonga katoa’ [empha-
sis added]. The English text translates this term as ‘the full exclusive and undisturbed possession 
of their .... other properties’14 [emphasis added]. In 1860, Governor Gore Brown defined taonga 
as ‘all other possessions.’15 However in 1986, the Waitangi Tribunal defined taonga katoa more 
broadly to include ‘all [Mäori] valued customs and possessions.’16 The Tribunal added that taonga 
in a metaphorical sense covers a variety of possibilities rather than itemised specifics consistent 
with the Mäori language,17 and as more than objects of tangible value that regulated daily life.18 
Under these juristic definitions and applying a ejusdem generis approach, taonga katoa in the 
Treaty should be construed to include the first law, Mäori customary law. Mäori custom was treas-
ured by the ancestors, and was an intangible object of immense value. It still is for many Mäori 
today. Jackson confirmed that the undertaking to preserve ‘other properties’ (taonga katoa) in 
Article II included ‘all things highly prized as their own customs and culture’19 [emphasis added]. 
William Colenso also described an incident prior to signing the Treaty where Governor Hobson 
agreed to protect Mäori custom in the alleged fourth Article of the Treaty (albeit an oral article).20 
To avert suspicion of the Treaty then, Governor Hobson issued a circular to the Rangatira (Chiefs) 
9 Charter for Erecting the Colony of New Zealand, and for Creating and Establishing a Legislative Council and an 
Executive Council, and for Granting Certain Powers and Authorities to the Governor for the time being of the said 
Colony, G.B.P.P (I.U.P. Shannon, Ireland) [1835-1842] Vol 3, 153.
10 Royal Instructions 5 Dec. 1840, G.B.P.P. (I.U.P Shannon, Ireland) [1835-1842] Vol 3, 156.
11 Ibid 156, 158, [13].
12 P McHugh, The Mäori Magna Carta (1991) 287.
13 Ibid.
14 I H Kawharu, Waitangi: Mäori and Päkehä Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (1989) 317.
15 Mäori Messenger (10 July and 26 July, 1860).
16 Waitangi Tribunal Report Findings of the Waitangi Tribunal. Relating to Te Reo Mäori (Wai-11, Wellington, 29 
April 1986) [4.2.4] [4.2.8] [4.2.3] 20.
17 Waitangi Tribunal, Report Findings and Recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal ... in Relation to Fishing 
Grounds in the Waitara District (Te Atiawa Report) (Wai-6, Wellington, 1983) [10.2a].
18 Above n 16 (Waitangi Tribunal) [4.2.4] [4.2.8].
19 M Jackson, He Whaipaanga Hou - A New Perspective - Mäori and the Criminal Justice System (Dept. of Justice, 
Wellington, 1988), 49. See also the proto-compendium discussion of taonga page 94.
20 W Colenso, The Authentic and Genuine History of the Signing of the Treaty of Waitangi (1890) 31-32. The alleged 
fourth Article orally stated: ‘E mea ana te Kawana ko nga whakapono katoa o Ingarani, o nga Weteriana, o Roma, 
me te ritenga Mäori hoki e tiakina ngatahitia e ia – The Governor says that the several faiths (beliefs) of England, of 
the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also Mäori custom shall alike be protected by him.’ Refer to C orange, The Treaty of 
Waitangi (1987) 53.
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assuring them that ‘their native customs would not be infringed, except in cases that are opposed 
to the principles of humanity and morals.’21 Furthermore, when subsequently asked about the sig-
nificance of the Treaty of Waitangi in the House of Commons in 1848, Lord Gladstone replied: 
‘As far as this country was concerned, there was not a more strictly and rigorously binding Treaty 
in existence.’22
In summary, the common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights and the partnership provisions 
and inclusion of taonga katoa within the Treaty of Waitangi affirm that first law, Mäori custom-
ary law, was not only to be officially recognised within the legal system of Aotearoa-New Zea-
land, but to be preserved and protected by the Imperial, Colonial and subsequent Governments 
of Aotearoa-New Zealand. Mäori customary laws and institutions should have been entrenched 
in the legal system following the Treaty. The Treaty and Mäori custom carried with them an ac-
knowledgment of the laws and institutions that had developed over the centuries to maintain law 
and order in Mäori society. The Treaty sought to encourage the integration and reconciliation of 
Mäori customary and English common law. 
C. Early Statutory Examples Recognising Mäori Custom as Law
It is not surprising then that in 1840 Governor Hobson issued orders to Shortland, police mag-
istrate of Kororareka, that ‘a rigid application of British law to the Mäori should be avoided in 
favour of some sort of compromise.’23 official instructions were forwarded from London direct-
ing the Governor to respect and uphold Mäori customary law within the legal system. In 1842, 
Lord Stanley suggested that certain Mäori institutions such as tapu (restriction laws)24 be incor-
porated into the legal system.25 Stanley also directed that legislation be framed in some measure 
to meet Mäori practices including punishment for desecrating wähi tapu (sacred places).26 one 
statutory example was the Native Exemption ordinance 184427 which provided that in crimes be-
tween Mäori, non-Mäori interference depended on Mäori request. In ‘mixed culture’ cases, Mäori 
convicted of theft could pay up to four times the value of goods stolen in lieu of other punishment 
21 GBPP, 1844, 556, Appendix, 349. Some exceptions were mentioned by Lord Russell who distinguished those Mäori 
customs that should be eliminated such as human sacrifice, polygamy and infanticide. Russell / Hobson, 9 Dec 1840, 
C.o. 209/8:480, 486-7.
22 Hansard (UK), Vol 86 (1848), 327-342. Governor Grey asked the same question earlier to Lord Stanley in the Co-
lonial office in 1845. Stanley replied: ‘In the name of the Queen … you will honourably and scrupulously fulfil the 
conditions of the Treaty of Waitangi.’ Stanley/Grey, 12 March 1845, C.o No. 1, G.1, 13. Cited in W D McIntyre & 
W J Gardiner, (eds) Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History (1971), 120.
23 Cited in P Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand 1830 - 1847 (1977), 211, 286.
24 Tapu is a condition affecting persons, places and things and entitles that person, place or thing to be treated with 
respect. It can also be described as a prohibition, but essentially its function is that of a protective device. Waddy de-
fined tapu as a ‘Code of Law’ far above and transcending all human laws, forming a Table of Mäori Commandments, 
owing its authority partly to superstition and partly to fear, but based primarily upon political motives and common 
sense. Early Mäori was ruled by the law of tapu. See P Waddy, ‘Tapu: A Code of Law: Criticism of Sir James Fraz-
er’s Views’ in P Waddy, ‘Early Law and Customs of the Maoris’ (MA Thesis, University of Victoria, Wellington, 
1927).
25 Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Memorandum, 23 August 1842.
26 Stanley Minute, 23 August 1842, Colonial office Records 209/14, 202.
27 ‘An ordinance to exempt in certain cases the Aboriginal Native Population of the Colony from the ordinary process 
and operation of the law.’ Legislative Council, ordinances, Session III, No. XVIII, 16 July 1844.
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which could be used to compensate the victim of theft and was an obvious adaptation of the Mäori 
customary institution of muru.28 
Perhaps arguably the most important yet overlooked constitutional provision that acknowl-
edged Mäori customary laws and institutions was section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852 which stated:
71. And whereas it may be expedient that the laws, customs, and usages of the Aboriginal or native in-
habitants of New Zealand, so far as they are not repugnant to the general principles of humanity, should 
for the present be maintained for the government of themselves, in all their relations to and dealings with 
each other, and that particular districts should be set apart within which such laws, customs, or usages 
should be so observed:
It shall be lawful for her Majesty, by any Letters Patent to be issued under the Great Seal of the United 
Kingdom, from time to time to make provision for the purposes aforesaid, any repugnancy of any such 
native laws, customs, or usages to the law of England, or to any law, statute, or usage in force in New 
Zealand, or in any part thereof, in anywise notwithstanding.
The section provided for the establishment of native districts where the first law, tikanga Mäori 
customary law, would prevail between Mäori inter se. Section 71 was neglected and later forgot-
ten however, and was not repealed until the Constitution Act 1986.
A further early statutory example acknowledging the first law of Aotearoa was the Resident 
Magistrates Courts ordinance 1846. The Resident Magistrates Courts ordinance provided that 
with disputes involving only Mäori, a Resident Magistrate was to sit with two Mäori rangatira 
(chiefs) appointed as Native Assessors and the case was determined according to equity and good 
conscience without being constrained by ‘strictly legal evidence’ pursuant to sections 7, 10, 13, 19 
and 20. The decision in each case was to be made by the two Assessors with intervention by the 
Magistrate only in cases of disagreement. According to section 22, no judgment was to be carried 
into effect unless all three members of the Court unanimously agreed. Mäori rangatira were to 
control their own people delivering to the European magistrate those individuals guilty of serious 
offences against settlers and to report regularly on the state of their districts. Payment of the As-
sessors was conditional on the successful execution of the judgment pursuant to section 24 of the 
ordinance.
For its time, the Resident Magistrates system with Mäori Assessors was perceived as a suc-
cessful initiative. The critical factor contributing its success was direct involvement of local Mäori 
leadership, adequate consultation with the local people about what laws would apply, and what 
role the chiefs should play in their enforcement.
In summary, the Treaty of Waitangi 1840, official Charters, Royal Instructions, the Resident 
Magistrates Courts ordinance 1846, and section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 all 
envisaged a polyphyletic system of hybrid laws for the new Colony whereby the settlers would 
govern settlers and Mäori would govern themselves according to their customary laws and institu-
28 Ordinances of New Zealand, sess. III, no. XVII. Muru was a ritualised compensatory institution where an offended 
party was allowed to take possessions owned by the offender party. The institution was an effective method for 
avoiding violent confrontations. See Te Karere o Niu Tireni (Auckland, 1 February, 1842), 6; ‘A Taranaki Veteran, 
The Great Muru’ in Journal of the Polynesian Society (Vol 28 , 1919), 97-102; ‘Ko te Muru Whakanui (Stripping to 
Exalt)’ in Te Manukura-Mäori Recorder (Auckland, February 1917), 13-14; and Rora, ‘Te Utu Hara’ in Te Ao Hou 
(No 16, october 1956), 22.
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tions. The explicit establishment of geo-political and bi-jural space was envisaged within the new 
legal system of Aotearoa-New Zealand regulated according to Mäori customary laws for Mäori.29
D. Mäori Translation of British Law – Simplified Approach to a Complex Reality
The difficulty Mäori had in comprehending and accepting an externally sourced and imposed mo-
nocultural code of laws foreign to their world view, values and customary laws was undoubtedly 
a source of future trouble.30 From the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, there was am-
biguity on how far English Law could apply in Aotearoa-New Zealand. Governor Gore Browne 
commented:
...to this may be added causes of dissatisfaction beyond our control, consequent upon the operation of 
laws suited to European civilisation, but not comprehended by a people who expect and desire an equita-
ble and summary award.31
The Colonial Government believed that ensuring the Mäori knew what the British law was would 
assist the problem of Mäori acquiescing to British law. To assist the process, Chief Justice Martin 
wrote Ko Nga Tikanga A Te Päkehä32 which was published by the Church Mission Press in 1845. 
This is more a philosophical piece about the basic approaches of English Law rather than a digest 
of laws. Martin described it as a ‘Letter to you to explain the Rules of the Päkehä for the admin-
istration of justice in various cases, and for several other things.’33 These were ‘good rules for the 
people who desire to live quietly.’34 When Martin returned to England due to ill health, the docu-
ment was republished in The Mäori Messenger in March 1856. A review of British law was sub-
sequently translated into the Mäori language in 1858.35 That year, Governor Gore Browne noted:
To confirm the reliance of the Natives on the wisdom and justice of our institutions it is important that 
the principles and to some extent the details also of our civil and criminal law should be made known 
amongst them in a familiar shape. With this view I have directed the compilation in the Native language 
of a summary of English law.36
At the same time the Government published in a number of Mäori newspapers brief accounts of 
the British mode of administering justice in the Courts of law and on the conduct of proceedings to 
assist Mäori to understand and grasp the new system.37 However, these initiatives were inadequate 
measures for dealing with a complex area. Translating English law into Mäori and writing a brief 
summary of the legal system would not solve Mäori juvenile delinquency for example, anymore 
29 New Zealand Constitution Act 1986, Long Title and s 26(1)(a). It has been a challenge for the researcher to locate 
historic de jure examples where s 71 was applied successfully. There were plenty of de facto examples by Mäori. For 
an analysis of the development and demise of s 71 of the Constitution Act 1852, see R Joseph, The Government of 
Themselves: Case Law, Policy and Section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, (2002). 
30 GBPP 1860, 194. Gore Browne / Labouchere, 15 April 1856.
31 Ibid.
32 Ko Nga Tikanga A Te Pakeha, (Church Mission Press, Auckland, 1845). For a version of this, see The Mäori Mes-
senger (March 31, 1856), 4-10.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 The Laws of England; compiled and translated into the Mäori Language (By direction of His Excellency Colonel 
Thomas Gore Browne¸ CB Governor of New Zealand, Auckland, 1858).
36 NZPD 1856-1858, 372.
37 ‘Nga Ture Päkehä’ in Te Karere o Poneke, (Vol 1, No 10, 26 November 1857); and ‘The English System’ in Te 
Manuhiri and Maori Intelligencer, (15 July 1861).
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than giving a lecture on the legal system and handing out the Crimes Act 1961 to burglars would 
prevent burglaries!
E. Judicial Denial of Mäori Custom
After the Constitution Act 1852, the learned Judges evaded the obligation to continue the applica-
tion of Mäori customary law and usage until customary title was extinguished. In Re The Lundon 
and Whitaker Claims Act 187138 the Court of Appeal reasserted that ‘the Crown was bound, both 
by the common law of England and by its solemn engagements (the Treaty of Waitangi), to a full 
recognition of native proprietary right.’39 The Court stated ‘whatever the extent of that right by 
established native custom appears to be, the Crown is bound to respect it.’40 This was the strong-
est judicial recognition of Mäori Aboriginal or customary title at the time. In contrast, in the 1877 
case of Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington,41 Prendergast CJ held that Mäori custom and usage did 
not exist. The Chief Justice reasoned:
Had any body or custom, capable of being understood and administered by the Courts of a civilized coun-
try, been known to exist, the British Government would surely have provided for its recognition, since 
nothing could exceed the anxiety displayed to infringe no just right of the aborigines. …
Whatever may be meant by the phrase “the persons or property, whatever real or personal, of the Mäori 
people,” the next following words, “and touching the title,” can only signify that the Court is enabled and 
required to entertain and determine questions of native title. The [Native rights Act 1865] speaks further 
on of the “Ancient Custom and Usage of the Mäori people” as if some such body of customary law did in 
reality exist. But a phrase in a statute cannot call what is non-existent into being. As we have shown, the 
proceedings of the British Government and the legislation of the colony have at all times been practically 
based on the contrary supposition that no such body of law existed; and herein have been in entire accord-
ance with good sense and indubitable facts. …
… If therefore, the contention of the plaintiff in the present case be correct, the Native Land Acts, guided 
only by “The Ancient Custom and Usage of the Mäori people, so far as the same can be ascertained,” is 
constituted the sole and unappealable judge of the validity of every title in the country.
Fortunately we are bound to affirm so startling a conclusion. The Crown, not being named in the statute, 
is clearly not bound by it; as the Act, if it bound the Crown, would deprive it of a prerogative right, that 
namely of conclusively determining when native title has been duly extinguished.42
Interestingly, Chief Justice Prendergast reinforced this finding in Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku43 
when he held that native districts where Mäori custom was the law, pursuant to section 10 of the 
New Zealand Government Act 1846,44 were never appointed because Mäori were British subjects 
governed by the laws of the land and not by their customary usages.45 
38 (1871) 2 NZ (CA) 41.
39 Ibid.
40 Re ‘The Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871 (1871) 2 NZ (CA) 41, 49.
41 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur. (N.S) S.C 79.
42 Ibid 77-78 and 79, 80.
43 (1889) 7 NZLR 235.
44 The New Zealand Government Act 1846 was the forerunner to the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852. Governor 
Grey managed to have the former Act suspended and subsequently over-ridden by the latter. S 10 was the equivalent 
to s 71 native districts in the former statute.
45 Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku (1889) 7 NZLR 235, 238-9.
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The Law Commission commented on a number of factors that combined to ensure that the 
second legal system of introduced laws and settler policies were geared towards the eclipse of the 
first legal system, Mäori customary law, which included:
a) The belief that English institutions and culture were innately superior, and it was in the best 
interests of Mäori to assimilate;
b) The desire to create an ideal English society in New Zealand;
c) The introduction of English laws and internalizing colonial values; and
d) The settlers desire for land resulting in land alienation from Mäori.46
Mäori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi and many of their values, customary laws and institu-
tions were marginalised and lay legally dormant following Wi Parata until the Treaty of Waitangi 
Act 1975 and the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal – almost 100 years! The Tribunal resur-
rected the first law, Mäori customary law, significantly within the legal system of Aotearoa-New 
Zealand.
iii. conTemporary LegaL auThoriTy for recognising 
mäori cusTomary Law
Two relevant truisms in British law are that Acts of Parliament are a source of law as is the com-
mon law as declared by the Courts. The common law of a country is a source of law. The com-
mon law in New Zealand however, is not the same as British common law because of differing 
local circumstances. Although some would argue the common law does not go far enough, it does 
still acknowledge Mäori values and customary laws in some contexts which make it different to 
other British common law jurisdictions. The unique legal system of Aotearoa-New Zealand has to 
acknowledge its history. This includes Mäori customary laws and usages which have been recog-
nised more recently by both Parliament and the Courts. By Parliament in section 18 of the oaths 
and Declarations Act 1957 which states:
18 Judicial oath
I swear that I will well and truly serve Her Majesty, Her heirs and successors, according to law, in the of-
fice of; and I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of New Zealand without fear 
or favour, affection or ill will. So help me God [emphasis added].47
The oath requires a Judge to do right to all people ‘after the laws and usages of New Zealand.’ It 
is inherent in the oath that the Judge will treat Mäori, Päkehä and other ethnic groups equally, ap-
plying both laws and ‘usages’ of New Zealand. Mäori customary laws and usages are the first law 
of Aotearoa-New Zealand law.
Similarly, section 3 of the Supreme Court Act 2003 states:
3 Purpose
The purpose of this Act is—
(a) to establish within New Zealand a new court of final appeal comprising New Zealand Judges—
(i) to recognise that New Zealand is an independent nation with its own history and traditions; and
46 New Zealand Law Commission, Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (NZLC SP9, Wellington, 2001), 22 
[97].
47 The Judicial oath, in this form, was first taken in New Zealand in 1873 in accordance with s 4 of the Promissory 
oaths Act 1873.
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(ii) to enable important legal matters, including legal matters relating to the Treaty of Waitangi, to 
be resolved with an understanding of New Zealand conditions, history, and traditions; and
(iii) to improve access to justice ... [emphasis added].
When one reads these sections together, both sections refer to New Zealand common law ac-
knowledging New Zealand history and traditions, the Treaty of Waitangi, and New Zealand laws 
and usages, which infer recognition, inter alia, of Mäori customary laws and ‘usages’.
Chief Justice Elias reaffirmed this proposition in the 2003 case of Attorney-General v Ngäti 
Apa,48 more commonly referred to as the ‘Foreshore and Seabed case’, ‘But from the beginning 
of the common law of New Zealand as applied in the Courts, differed from the common law of 
England because it reflected local circumstances.’49
Chief Justice Elias continued:
Any prerogative of the Crown as to property in the foreshore or seabed as a matter of English common 
law in 1840 cannot apply in New Zealand if displaced by local circumstances. Mäori custom and usage 
recognising property in the foreshore and seabed lands displaces any English Crown Prerogative and is 
effective as a matter of New Zealand law unless such property interests have been lawfully extinguished. 
The existence and extent of any such property interest is determined by application of tikanga.50
The above legal authorities confirm that the common law of Aotearoa-New Zealand is not the 
same as the common law of England or Australia or Canada, because it reflects local circumstanc-
es. one such local circumstance that makes the Aotearoa-New Zealand legal system distinct is the 
acknowledgement of its first law, Mäori customary laws and usages. 
In determining whether it is permissible to apply Mäori custom in any given setting, the Judg-
es must consider whether it is a ‘usage’ properly to be applied as part of the law of Aotearoa/ New 
Zealand. It is also important to try to understand the Mäori world view that provides the founda-
tion for Mäori customary laws, usages and institutions.
iv. firsT and second Law conTrasT
In terms of contrasting British newcomer law and Mäori customary law, Durie highlighted the 
former as being rules-based Western law (literate) while the latter is governed by values to which 
the community generally subscribed (non-literate and performative).51 While Western culture 
tends to make a clear separation between morality and the law, the Mäori legal system sees values, 
practices and rules as being very much interrelated. Metge noted however, that ‘Western laws are 
also values-based, the values concerned being interpreted by the law makers.’52 Mulgan added:
All law, Päkehä as well as Mäori, arises out of social norms and the need to enforce these norms within 
society. The ultimate source of Päkehä law is not the courts or statutes but the social values reflected by 
Parliament in statutes and by Judges in their decisions.53
48 [2003] 3 NZLR 577.
49 Ibid 652, [17].
50 Ibid 660, [49].
51 E Durie, ‘Mäori Custom Law’ (Unpublished Paper, Wellington, 1994), 3.
52 J Metge, ‘Commentary on Judge Durie’s Custom Law’ (Unpublished Custom Law Guidelines Project Paper, 1997), 
5.
53 R Mulgan, ‘Commentary on Chief Judge Durie’s Custom Law Paper from the Perspective of a Pakeha Political Sci-
entist’ (Unpublished Paper, Law Commission, 1997), 2.
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Metge concluded that the main difference between Western law and Mäori customary law or 
tikanga Mäori originates in their respective sources and in the contrast between oral and written 
modes of communication:
Tikanga arise out of on-going community debate and practice and are communicated orally; as a result 
they are adapted to changing circumstances easily, quickly and without most people being consciously 
aware of the shift. Western laws are formulated and codified by a formal law-making body and are pub-
lished in print; their amendment, while possible, is a complex and lengthy process. As a result laws often 
lag behind community opinion and practice; at times, however, they can be ahead and formative of it.54
Although Mäori values, customs and norms were largely idealised, they were ‘law’ in a jurispru-
dence context and they constituted a legal system, given that the application or neglect of customs 
and norms would have provoked a predictable response. Most anthropologists nowadays accept 
that all human societies have law, whether or not they have formal laws and law courts. Metge 
commented:
Except in times of exceptional crisis, all human societies pursue as key aims the maintenance 
of order, the reinforcement of accepted values and the punishment of breaches. Large-scale, com-
plex state societies codified into a system courts and Judges. Small-scale societies with simpler 
political structures use means which are mainly informal, implicit and serve other purposes as 
well.55
In some circles the study of customary law has been described as legal anthropology56 which 
Rouland points out is the study of law in society.57 It begins from the premise that all societies 
have law. Rouland identified that there are over 10,000 distinct known legal systems operating in 
the world today. A study of those systems indicates the following generalisations can be made:
Law emerges with the beginning of social existence;
The complexity of law in a society will depend on the complexity or simplicity of that soci-
ety; e.g. How many stratas in that society, the nature of its economy etc;
All societies possess political power that relies to some degree on the coercive power of law, 
while the modern state is only present in some of these societies;
Where the state exists, customs and ritual may have been codified or reduced to judgment by 
the instruments of the state e.g. the common law imported into New Zealand from Britain in 
1840;
In all societies law represents certain values and fulfils certain functions; however, the com-
mon principles of law are:
- the search for justice; and
- the preservation of social order and collective security;
Law is obeyed in different societies because individuals are socialised to obey, they believe in 
the just nature of the law, they seek the protection of the law, or they fear sanctions associated 
with non-observance.58
54 Metge, above n 52, 5.
55 Ibid 2.
56 C Wickliffe, K Maranui & P Meredith, ‘Access to Customary Law’ (Visible Justice: Evolving Access to Law, Wel-
lington, 12 September 1999), 1-2. 
57 See generally N Rouland, Legal Anthropology (1994) and the discussion by Boast in R Boast, ‘Maori Customary 
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on this approach, laws are nothing more than societal rules which have to be practically sanc-
tioned in the here-and-now. Legal anthropology sets itself the objective of understanding these 
rules of human behavior,59 which must be designed to address wrongdoing and, inter-alia, be ca-
pable of being socially and practically enforced in the interests of the community. only then will 
they be considered part of the legal domain of a society.60
v. generaL cusTomary Law
A definition of ‘customary law’ is defined as ‘both a body of rules backed by sanctions and a set 
of dispute resolution mechanisms.61 At a more informal level it was also a ‘series of accepted 
behaviours which allowed daily social life to proceed; the stuff of interpersonal relationships, the 
self-regulating patterns of interaction.’62 In terms of Mäori law and a Mäori legal system being 
based on custom, the Oxford English Dictionary records two distinct meanings of ‘Custom’:
1. A habitual or usual practice; common way of acting; usage, fashion, habit, (either of an individual or 
of a community); and
2. Law. An established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force of a law or right.63
The distinction needs to be made between custom that is mere habit (or fashion) – usual but nev-
ertheless optional – and custom that gives rise to obligation and right. The 1608 Case of Tanistry 
affirmed the potency of custom as a source of law in this way:
... custom, in the understanding of the law, is such usage as has acquired the force of law and is respected 
as a binding law in a particular place ... Because when the people find any rule to be good and beneficial, 
suitable and agreeable to their nature and disposition, they use and practice it from time to time; and it 
happens through frequent repetition and multiplication of the rule, Custom is created: and having been 
followed for as long as people can remember, acquires the force of law.... In brief, custom is a reasonable 
rule, followed consistently and continuously by the people from time immemorial.64
Sir John Salmond makes a similar distinction between mere habit and customary law when, in set-
ting out the requirements for the reception of custom as law, he includes the following:
The third requisite of the operation of a custom as a source of law is that it must have been observed as 
of right. A merely voluntary practice, not conceived as based on any rule of right or obligation, does not 
amount to a legal custom… A legal custom must be the embodiment in inveterate practice of the convic-
tion of the community as to the rights and obligations of its members towards one another.65
59 Ibid.
60 Above n 56 (Wickliffe et al), 2.
61 Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (2 Vols, Canberra, Australia, 
1986) [37], Vol 1.
62 Ibid. 
63 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed (Vol IV, 1989). This section draws heavily from the work of the Te Mätähaua-
riki Research Institute, School of Law, at the University of Waikato. The author draws from a number of Te 
Mätähauariki references the most relevant being ‘Te Matapunenga: A Compendium of References to the Concepts 
and Institutions of Mäori Customary Law: Proto-Compendium’ (Unpublished, Te Mätähauariki Institute, University 
of Waikato, June 2007 Draft Version), 3-8. The author was a Senior Research Fellow for Te Mätähauariki.
64 Case of Tanistry, 80 Eng. Rep. 516 (1608), quoted in E K Braybrooke, ‘Custom as a Source of English Law’ in Mich-
igan Law Review (Vol 50, 1951) 71, 73. For more detailed discussion, see A Frame, Grey and Iwikau: A Journey into 
Custom, (2002), 29.
65 Sir John Salmond, Jurisprudence, (7th ed) (1924), 219.
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But what will suffice to add the ‘obligatory’ aspect, which turns custom into ‘customary law’? 
Will organised and systematic social pressure, in the absence of formally constituted judicial and 
enforcing authorities, allow us to find ‘customary law’? The American theorist, Hoebel, asserted:
A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of 
physical force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognised privilege of so acting.66
Hoebel’s definition is considerably wider than that of the school of Western jurisprudence, which 
saw the predominant characteristic of ‘law properly so-called’ as a ‘command’ within a unitary 
political system, backed by force. The American jurist Lon Fuller has criticised this tendency to 
assume ‘that law must be regarded as a one-way projection of authority, instead of being con-
ceived as a collaborative enterprise.’67 Whatever may have been the contemporary political rea-
sons for the adoption of such a restrictive view by British theorists such as Hobbes, Bentham and 
Austin, the criticism of Sir Carleton Allen in his Introduction to Sir Henry Maine’s Ancient Law 
seems well aimed:
Its exclusion of historical considerations from the province of jurisprudence led it into the radical fallacy 
of regarding all systems of law as being typified by Western European monarchical states.68
Although Hoebel’s definition is open to objection for clinging to a central position for ‘force’ 
as the identifier of ‘law’,69 the definition is helpful, given that collective social recognition and 
reinforcement of ‘supernatural’ consequences constitutes a degree of social pressure, which is 
functionally equivalent to more direct applications of physical force. Fuller had raised, but left 
unanswered, this very question in relation to Hoebel’s definition:
Just what is meant by force when it is taken as the identifying mark of law? If in a theocratic society the 
threat of hell-fire suffices to secure obedience to its law, is this ‘a threat of force’? 70
Fuller preferred to state simply that:
A legal system, to be properly called such, has to achieve some minimum efficacy in practical affairs, 
whatever the basis of that efficacy – a proposition both unobjectionable and quite unexciting.71
The approach which discounts centrally administered force as the defining characteristic of ‘law’ 
has antecedents in the work of writers such as von Gierke, Ehrlich, Weber and Pospisil who deny 
that there is any practical reason to confine the meaning of ‘law’ to situations in which coercion is 
guaranteed by the political authority.72 Max Weber has pointed out that:
Law, convention, and custom belong to the same continuum with imperceptible transitions leading from 
one to the other … It is entirely a question of terminology and convenience at which point of this con-
tinuum we shall assume the existence of the subjective conception of a ‘legal obligation.’73
66 E A Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study of Comparative Legal Dynamics, (1954), 28.
67 L Fuller, The Morality of Law, (first published in 1964, revised edition 1969), 227.
68 Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, (first published 1861, with Introduction by Sir Carleton Allen, The World’s Classics, 
1959), xiii.
69 Fuller, for example, states that ‘the notion that its authorization to use physical force can serve to identify law… has 
done great harm to clarity of thought about the functions performed by law,’ above n 67 (Fuller), 108.
70 Above n 67 (Fuller), 109.
71 Ibid, 109-110. Interestingly, the Mäori and Polynesian concept of mana is often explained as requiring, among other 
things, effectiveness in social affairs.
72 See L Pospisil, ‘Legal Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies,’ The Journal of Conflict Reso-
lution, (Vol XI, No.1, March 1967), 2-26.
73 M Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, (ed G Roth and C Wittich, transl. E Fischoff, 
Vol 1, (1978), 319-321.
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We must be conscious also of drawing too firm a distinction between ‘obligatory’ and ‘persua-
sive’ norms, a point recently made by Professor Bruno Saura in Tahiti:
The very idea of distinguishing between obligatory customs, because they are of a legal nature, and cus-
toms which are more or less arbitrary stems from a Western perspective in which Judges – rather than 
priests, sorcerers or divine forces – are in charge of issuing punishments for breaches of matters that the 
community deems crucial to respect.74
Malinowski, in his introduction to Hogbin’s Law and Order in Polynesia, made some pertinent 
observations on the ‘law-not-law’ debate concerning custom:
Those rules, the working of which are essential for the maintenance of such primitive institutions as the 
family, the village community, forms of organized economic co-operation, chieftainship or religious in-
stitutions, are entirely compatible with our rules of law. They are really obligatory, they are enforced.
our own law is nothing but intrinsically valid custom, custom safeguarding the smooth working of our 
institutions, custom obeyed not so much through the fear of penalties but for much deeper reasons which 
the sociologist and psychologist have to discover.
Co-operation always implies a body of people united by some fundamental constitution, that is, body of 
rules, which regulates their mutual behaviour.75
Custom then has historically been a basis of law for all people. The common law reflects society’s 
common customs and values as Fitzgerald noted in Salmond on Jurisprudence:
It was long the received theory of English law that whatever was not the product of legislation had its 
sources in custom. Law was either the written statute law, or the unwritten, common, or customary law. 
Judicial precedent was not conceived as being itself a legal source of law at all, for it was held to operate 
only as evidence of those customs from which the common law proceeded. … Even now custom has not 
wholly lost its law-creating efficacy. It is still to be accounted one of the legal sources of the law of Eng-
land, along with legislation and precedent, but far below them in importance.76
The co-operative and reciprocal elements in customary law systems seem to require explicit rec-
ognition in any definition which aims to comprehend the social foundation of law. Hence, the fol-
lowing adaptation of Hoebel’s definition of Indigenous customary law:
A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of 
force or the imposition of serious social disadvantage by an individual, group, or agency possessing the 
socially recognized privilege of so acting. 77
The idea that social norms found in traditional performance cultures were either not law at all 
or, at best, only ‘primitive law’ has been a persistent error in European jurisprudence. It is often 
found coupled with analyses that propose an ‘evolutionary scale’ for law in which fully-fledged 
law only emerges as societies struggle into the light of written law, administered in a centralised 
way by specialist Courts. Maclaurin provided a contribution to the ‘evolutionary scale’ view of 
legal development in which some Indigenous systems were termed ‘primitive.’78 It would seem to 
be neither a necessary nor a desirable step to derive from such analysis any classificatory or defi-
nitional ‘scale’ of law as more or less ‘primitive.’ Concepts, institutions and procedures may be 
74 B Saura, ‘Chapter 4,’ in P de Deckker and J-Y Faberon, (eds), Custom and the Law, (2001), 81.
75 B Malinowski, ‘Introduction’ in H I Hogbin, Law and Order in Polynesia, (first published 1934) (1972). The three 
quoted excerpts are from pages xxix, xxx and xxxii of the Introduction.
76 P Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed) (1966), 189-190.
77 E A Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study of Comparative Legal Dynamics, (1954), 28.
78 R C Maclaurin, ‘Title to Realty’ in R C Maclaurin, On the Nature and Evidence of Title to Realty, (1901), 3-5.
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judged to work, or not, in a particular social context but that does not seem to provide a basis for 
describing law as ‘primitive’ or ‘advanced,’ any more than a particular language could intelligibly 
be characterised in that way. The author agrees with the view expressed by Professor Rouland of 
the University of Aix in this regard:
We believe, following Levi-Strauss, that there is not a pensee des sauvages (thinking of the savages) and 
a pensee des civilises (thinking of the civilised). Rather the pensee sauvage and the pensee civilise exist, 
in different degrees, in all forms of humanity – rationality is not our privileged domain, any more than 
custom belongs exclusively to exotic societies, it can be as ‘modern’ as the law.79
The traditional legal system and first law of Aotearoa-New Zealand was tikanga Mäori customary 
law.
A. Tikanga Mäori Customary Law
The traditional Mäori legal system was not primitive but was based on tikanga Mäori customary 
law and kawa (rituals) which were generated by performative social practice and acceptance as 
distinct from ‘institutional law’, which is generated from the organs of a super-ordinate author-
ity.80 The principles of tikanga Mäori customary law provided the jural order which embodies 
core values and principles that reflect doing what is right, correct or appropriate. Tikanga Mäori 
comprises a spectrum with values at one end and rules at the other, but with values informing the 
whole range. It includes the values themselves and does not differentiate between sanction-backed 
laws and advice concerning non-sanctioned customs. People were taught from a young age what 
was tika (right, correct) and they, in effect, governed and regulated themselves. 
The Mäori legal system based on tikanga Mäori customary law was used to make decisions 
regarding, inter alia:
leadership and governance concerning all matters including Mäori land;81
intra and inter-relationships with whänau (extended families) hapü (sub-tribes), iwi 
(tribes/nations);82
relationships with Europeans;83
determining rights to land based on take tupuna (discovery), take tukua (gift), take raupatu 
(confiscation) and ahi kaa (occupation);84
the exercise of kaitiakitanga (stewardship) practises including the imposition of rahui (bans 
on the taking of resources or the entering into zones within a territory) and other similar 
customs;85
regulating use rights for hunting, fishing and gathering and sanctioning those who trans-
gressed Mäori tikanga or Mäori rights (or both) in land and other resources;86
79 R Norbert, ‘Chapter 1,’ in P de Deckker and J-Y Faberon, (eds) Custom and the Law (2001), 14.
80 Above n 51 (Durie), 4.
81 Above n 56 (Wickliffe et al) and above n 57 (Boast et al), 30-37.
82 Ibid (Boast et al), 33-37, 38-41.
83 Ibid 28-30.
84 A Erueti, ‘Maori Customary Law and Land Tenure’ in ibid, 42-45; G Asher & D Naulls, Maori Land (New Zealand 
Planning Council, Wellington, 1987), 5-6; and H Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure: Studies of a Changing Institution 
(1977), 55-56.








88 Waikato Law Review Vol 17
regulating Mäori citizenship rights to land and resources.87
Specific Mäori customary laws and values which seemed to underpin the totality of tikanga Mäori 
customary law include:
Whänaungatanga – kin relationships between people and the rights and obligations that fol-
low from the individuals place in the collective group;
Wairuatanga – spirituality, acknowledging the metaphysical world;
Mana – encompasses political influence as well as intrinsic authority, honour, status, control, 
and prestige of an individual and group;
Tapu – generally seen as part of a code for social conduct based upon keeping safe and avoid-
ing risk, as well as protecting the sanctity of revered persons, places and objects and tradi-
tional values; restriction laws;
Noa – free from tapu or any other restriction;
Utu – concept of reciprocity in order to maintain balanced relationships between people and 
the Gods;
Rangatiratanga – effective leadership; and
Manaakitanga – sharing, hospitality to the fullest extent that honour could require;
Aroha – charity, generosity;
Kaitiakitanga – stewardship and protection, often used in relation to natural resources. 
There are many tikanga Mäori values and customs, as described above, but no complete list has 
been agreed. Associated with these values are certain other characteristics. For example, custom 
tends to favour community autonomy, rather than some large, centralised control, and puts group 
rights ahead of those of the individual. Furthermore, each iwi (tribe) and hapü (sub-tribe) had its 
own variation of the values and customs listed – some will have slightly different ideas as to the 
values which inform the first law of Aotearoa-New Zealand.
Leaving aside ritual, the main regulators of conduct appear to be these broad tikanga values 
and customs above rather than prescriptive rules. For example, the Mäori value ‘whänaungatanga’ 
describes an aspiration of supporting the family, clan or relatives to the fullest extent that honour 
could require. Some specific practices provide sound or compelling advice on what constitutes 
good conduct in this respect, but as in most Mäori values, the focus is on the best that a person 
might strive for rather than the minimum required to comply. That definition invites reference to 
the values, principles and norms accepted by the Mäori communities as establishing standards for 
appropriate conduct and to processes acceptable to those communities for determining the appro-
priate course of action in a particular case.
Durie noted an important difference between tikanga and kawa:
Tikanga described Mäori law, and kawa described ritual and procedure … ritual and ceremony them-
selves were described by kawa … [which] referred also to process and procedure of which ‘karakia’ (the 
rites of incantation) formed part.88
Karetu added a number of the significant traditional kawa or performative rituals and their per-
petuation within the Mäori legal system:
87 Above n 84 (Kawharu) 39, above n 84 (Erueti), 33-35, above n 84 (Asher and Naulls), 7; and above n 51 (Durie), 5.
88 Above n 51 (Durie), 3. For a further good and recent reference on tikanga Mäori customary law, see N Tomas, ‘Key 
Concepts of Tikanga Mäori (Mäori Custom Law) in Tai Tokerau: Past and Present’ (PhD Thesis Dissertation, Uni-
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Before the coming of the Päkehä [European] to New Zealand… all literature in Mäori was oral. Its 
transmission to succeeding generations was also oral and a great body of literature, which includes haka 
[dance], waiata [song], tauparapara [chant], karanga [chant], poroporoaki [farewell], paki waitara [sto-
ries], whakapapa [genealogy], whakatauki [proverbs] and pepeha [tribal sayings], was retained and learnt 
by each new generation.89
Given the differences in legal systems, tikanga Mäori customary law is not easily reconciled with-
in the existing legal framework of New Zealand. The former comprises a plethora of norms which 
enables participants to call upon those which best fit the moment while the latter centers upon 
single rules which are of general application and are more fluid. 
B. Contemporary Scope and Use of Tikanga within the Legal System
Despite the major societal transformation Mäori communities have undergone, Bennion believes 
the changes to tikanga Mäori customary law rarely produced changes to the ‘fundamental value 
system.’90 Although tikanga Mäori customary law may be considered as unofficial rules not sub-
ject to legal sanctions in the current legal system, they are still regularly adhered to by many 
Mäori. Tikanga Mäori customary law can be seen in its most overt form on the various Marae 
(Mäori meeting houses). Mäori communities do not always expect detailed legal rules such as 
trust orders made by the Mäori Land Court to be followed closely91 because legal rules are more 
referred to as guidelines.92 Mäori communities may however, apply Mäori custom, consciously 
or unconsciously, in the everyday management of community and family affairs. Today, they 
may also apply custom consciously, for example, as a result of provisions they have made for the 
resolution of disputes in the charters of Mäori governance entities that they have established for 
the administration of their tribe’s affairs.93 To this end, tikanga Mäori customary references can be 
found in the constitutional documents of a number of Mäori legal entities such as Te Kauhanganui 
o Waikato,94 Te Rünanga a Iwi o Ngapuhi,95 and Wakatu Incorporation.96
New Zealand’s positivist legal system tends to ignore the first law of Aotearoa-New Zealand 
unless they have been captured in legislation or in the common law. There are now a number 
89 T Karetu, ‘Language and Protocol of the Marae’, in M King, (ed) Te Ao Hurihuri: The World Moves On (3rd ed) 
(1981).
90 T Bennion, The Mäori Law Review (March 2001), available at http://www.bennion.co.nz/mlr/2001/mar.html.> (last 
accessed September 2009). 
91 For a comprehensive discussion on Mäori custom on the Marae, see H Tauroa and P Tauroa, Te Marae: A Guide to 
Customs and Protocol (The New Zealand Museum, Wellington, 1986). For a comprehensive discussion of the Ma-
rae, its origin, functions and protocol, see A Salmond, Hui: A Study of Mäori Ceremonial Gatherings (Reed Publish-
ers, Auckland, 1975).
92 J Williams, ‘The Mäori Land Court – a Separate Legal System?’ (Paper presented at the Victoria University of Wel-
lington Public Law Seminar Series Address, Victoria University of Wellington Law School, Wellington, 10 July 
2001).
93 Above n 51 (Durie), 7.
94 Te Kauhanganui o Waikato-Tainui Inc, Rule 3 objects include supporting the Kiingitanga and fostering the princi-
ples of whakaiti (humility), rangimaarie (peacefulness) and kia tuupato (being careful).
95 Clauses 3.2 (a) (c) and (e), Te Rünanga-Ä-Iwi-O-Ngäpuhi Charitable Trust Deed (Ratified 10 September 2005) state 
that Te Rünanga-Ä-Iwi-o-Ngäpuhi Trust shall ‘pursue the vision Kia tü tika ai Te Whare Tapu o Ngäpuhi (stand firm 
on the sanctity of Ngäpuhi); kaitiakitanga (stewardship) and ahi kä (occupation); and will make decisions consistent 
with the tikanga of Ngäpuhi.’
96 ‘A business of land and sea – he taonga tuku iho – for profit, social and cultural growth through professionalism, hon-
esty and diligence and embracing our tikanga.’ Available at http://www.wakatu.org.nz (Last accessed July 2009).
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of civil law statutes that recognise tikanga Mäori custom including the Treaty of Waitangi Act 
1975,97 the Resource Management Act 1991,98 Te Ture Whenua Mäori Act 1993,99 the Mäori 
Fisheries Act 2004100 and the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004101 to name just five. Then there are 
an array of statutes that refer to the Treaty of Waitangi.102 These statutes by implication include 
tikanga Mäori customary law. 
In terms of criminal law, there are a number of processes based on Mäori custom which do 
not pose a threat to the adversarial criminal justice system. The ability to address the Court in 
te reo Mäori (the Mäori language),103 of Kaumätua (Elders) to address the Court in a pre-trial 
proceeding,104 and the wider acceptance of Mäori protocol in Court proceedings have no substan-
tive impact on the adversarial contest. The availability of Mäori focused restorative justice pro-
grammes demonstrates an acknowledgement of Mäori custom in the legal system. Section 10 of 
the Sentencing Act 2002 provides a direct legislative pathway for the Mäori customary institution 
of muru (ritualised compensation ceremony) and the Samoan institution of ifoga (formal apology 
ceremony) to be accorded judicial recognition by permitting the Court to take offers of amends 
into account at sentencing. 
Furthermore, the Mäori Community Development Act 1962 permits Mäori committees to im-
pose penalties on Mäori for certain conduct falling within the Summary offences Act 1981. The 
Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 provides for family group conferences to 
address youth offending which can be held at Marae (Mäori meeting houses) with Mäori facilita-
tors and Kaumätua (Elders) present.105 
Although the Courts apply Mäori custom where statutes so allow, the Judges have been pre-
pared more recently to apply Mäori custom even without a statutory reference where custom is a 
relevant fact or the Treaty of Waitangi is a relevant consideration.106 In addition, Mäori customary 
law can provide the basis for title in land,107 forms the basis for fishing rights,108 and can assist in 
the definition of a statutory concept.109 
97 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, Schedule 1.
98 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 2, 14, 39, 42, 146, 199 and 269.
99 Te Ture Whenua Mäori Act 1993, ss 4, 7, 26, 32, 36, 61, 62, 106, 114, 129, 132, 150 and 338.
100 Mäori Fisheries Act 2004, ss 4, 44, 88, 101, and Schedule 7.
101 Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, ss 5, 35, 50, 53, 64, 65 and Schedule 1.
102 For example, the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss 1 and 2; Resource Management Act 1991, ss 8, 45 and 141B; Te 
Ture Whenua Mäori Act 1993, ss 7, 18 and 339; the Mäori Fisheries Act 2004, ss 4, 5, 19, 15, 31, 32, 34, 45, and 188-
211; Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, ss 10, 34, 49, 73 and 101; the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 
1995, ss 6, 8, 10, 14, 26, 30, 38 and Schedule 1; the Ngäi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, ss 10, 34, 35, 48, 103, 
274, 304 and 305; Te Rünanga o Ngäti Awa Act 2005, ss 3 and 11; and the Mäori Television Service (Te Aratuku 
Whakaata Irirangi Mäori) Act 2003, s 3.
103 S 4, Maori Language Act 1987.
104 Police v Taurua [2002] DCR 306 (DC).
105 P Heath, ‘one law for All – Problems in Applying Maori Custom Law in a Unitary State’ in (Te Mätähauariki Re-
search Institute, Tuhonohono Symposium: Custom & State, Hopuhopu 22-24 June 2007), 12.
106 For example, Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC).
107 Attorney-General v Ngäti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA).
108 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC).
109 For example, the meaning of kaitiakitanga (stewardship) under s 7, Resource Management Act 1991.
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vi. scope for mäori cusTom in courT
In seeking to determine ‘the Mäori law’ on a matter, early Judges do not appear to have appreci-
ated that Mäori did not determine law in the same way as they did. Mäori gave more weight to 
mediated outcomes or they sought the justice of the case according to the whole context and with-
out a comparable search for a single governing rule.
Moreover, the distinction between custom as understood by Mäori, and custom as recognised 
by the Courts, is important because of the extraordinary modification of custom law for example, 
customary land tenure from the 1800s following decisions of the Native Land Court that purported 
to apply Mäori custom to determine the ownership and devolution of interests in Mäori land. This 
process was acknowledged as problematic by Chief Judge Robert Stout in a newspaper in 1905:
What his Honour presumed the Native Land Court had to do, was to incorporate English law and Mäori 
custom together, and from this conglomerated law find succession, and call it according to Mäori custom. 
It seemed to his Honour that the time had come when there should be some authoritative definition of 
what Mäori custom or usage was. It should not be left to the Native Land Court Judges to declare what 
they think Native custom is.110
To some extent the same problem has surfaced more recently in the adoption of processes based 
on tikanga Mäori custom by other Courts.
A. Institutional Challenges to Mäori Custom
Institutional acceptance of tikanga Mäori custom law does have its limits. While the Courts have 
been willing to treat a concluded hui (meeting) at which a full apology was proffered111 and an 
accepted ifoga112 as a mitigating factor at sentencing, they have rejected both as representing a 
complete punishment. Furthermore, various tikanga Mäori customary laws have been debated in 
Court in terms of meaning and scope which has, with respect, perplexed the Judges.
Mäori custom is generally not recognised as a freestanding source of law in its own right. A 
critical challenge facing the Judiciary in applying substantive Mäori customary law then lies in 
their lack of understanding of te reo Mäori (language), mätauranga Mäori (world views, knowl-
edge base) and general tikanga Mäori customary law. one facet of this misunderstanding is the 
fact that Judges do not understand the relevant concept in its philosophical and cultural base and 
world view to maintain its integrity. 113 
In determining whether it is permissible to apply Mäori custom in any given setting, the Judg-
es must consider whether it is a custom or ‘usage’ properly to be applied as part of the law of New 
Zealand. In determining this question, it is important to remember that there is as much a ‘Mäori 
law’ as there is a ‘Mäori language.’114 It is also important to try to understand the Mäori world 
view that provides the platform for Mäori customary laws, usages and institutions.
As a result, questions of custom fall to be determined as questions of fact, leaving the Court 
heavily reliant on the expert witnesses produced by the parties. A thorough knowledge of tikanga 
Mäori, te reo Mäori (the Mäori language) and Mäori culture provide the basis against which to 
110 ‘on Maori Customs Being Codified’ in New Zealand Times (30 August 1905), 6.
111 R v P (HC Auckland CRI 2005-063-1213 9 August 2006 Priestly J).
112 R v Maposua (CA 131/04 3 September 2004); and R v Talataina (1991) 7 CRNZ 33 (CA).
113 Above n 105 (Heath), 18-19. A recent controversial example is the High Court case of Clarke v Takamore (HC 
Christchurch CIV 2007-409-001971, July 2009 Fogarty J).
114 E Durie, ‘Will the Settlers Settle? Cultural Conciliation and Law’ in Otago Law Review (1996) 449, 451.
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test the evidence of those who purport to be experts in a particular Mäori customary law. This is 
particularly so where there are two competing accounts of tikanga Mäori customary law.
The use of Mäori words and tikanga concepts in a statute or other official texts increases the 
possibility of ambiguity, which can be deliberately exploited in the Courts. Key examples of this 
include the ‘iwi’ (tribe)115 and ‘wähi tapu’ (sacred places)116 debates in Court. An example of the 
latter was the Court of Appeal’s approach in Watercare Services v Minhinnick117 where the lower 
Court was asked what is a wähi tapu and to support the notion that, when considering whether the 
piping of sewerage over wähi tapu was ‘offensive, or objectionable to such an extent that it has or 
is likely to have an adverse effect on the environment,’ the appropriate test was what the ordinary 
Mäori person would find objectionable. The Court of Appeal rejected that view finding that the 
relevant test was that of the community at large – presumably no matter how ignorant that com-
munity might be of Mäori values and customs, or, more importantly, its own hidden assumptions 
and prejudices. 
As a result of these and other cases, it is often considered critical to the maintenance of tikanga 
Mäori custom, that the applicable custom should be determined by persons with the necessary 
customary knowledge and skills. The critical question then is not ‘what is the custom?’ but ‘who 
decides, in what context, and by what process?’ In terms of deciding questions of tikanga Mäori 
customary law, the High Court is neither the appropriate forum nor is litigation the appropriate 
process for making such decisions.
B. Testing the Evidence – Te Matapunenga Project
When trying to define tikanga Mäori customary law, Metge wisely cautioned on this point:
To come to grips with Mäori custom law, it is necessary to recognise that Mäori concepts hardly ever cor-
respond exactly with those Western concepts which they appear, on the surface, to resemble. While there 
is a degree of overlap, there are usually divergences as well. Even if the denotation – the direct reference 
– is substantially the same, the connotations are significantly different.118
Hence those qualified to articulate the values and practices inherent in tikanga Mäori are Mäori 
schooled in tikanga Mäori through a life experience of tikanga, especially respected Kaumätua 
(Elders). But what happens when Kaumätua slightly or even diametrically disagree over what 
constitutes ‘authentic’ tikanga or the details and scope of a group’s tikanga and customary laws? 
Judges have resorted to dictionaries and documentary sources to prove or disprove the existence, 
115 The word ‘Iwi’ is included in the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Settlement) Act 1992, s 3; and the Mäori Fisheries 
Act 1989, s 6, and was subsequently exploited through High Court and Privy Council litigation in, among other cases, 
Te Waka Hi Ika o Te Arawa v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission [2000] 1 NZLR 285 (HC & CA); and Manu-
kau Urban Authority v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission [2002] 2 NZLR 17 (PC).
116 For an analysis of the use of the tikanga Mäori custom ‘wähi tapu’ (sacred places) in a Resource Management Act 
1991 context, see R Joseph, and T Bennion, ‘Challenges of Incorporating Mäori Values and Tikanga under the Re-
source Management Act 1991 and the Local Government Bill – Possible Ways Forward’ in Yearbook of New Zea-
land Jurisprudence (Vol 6, No.1, 2002-2003), 9. A number of key cases litigating wähi tapu include, inter alia, 
Countdown Properties (Northland) Ltd v Dunedin City Council [1994] NZRMA 145 (HC); Watercare Services Ltd v 
Minhinnick [1998] NZRMA 113; Te Runanga o Ati Awa ki Whakarongotai Inc & Takamore Trustees v New Zealand 
Historic Places Trust (W23/2002, 4 July 2002, Wellington); and Winstone Aggregates Ltd & Heartbeat Charitable 
Trust v Franklin District Council (A80/02, 17 April 2002, Auckland, HC).
117 [1998] NZRMA 113.
118 Above n 52 (Metge), 3.
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extent and scope of tikanga Mäori customary law in a particular area which tends towards the aca-
demic and away from the determinative Mäori spiritual and cultural context.119 
The work of Te Mätähauariki Research Institute in the School of Law at the University of 
Waikato may be of some assistance here.120 one of the key projects of Te Mätähauariki was the 
assembling of a collection of references to the concepts and institutions of Mäori customary law 
to explore ways in which the legal system of Aotearoa-New Zealand could better reflect the best 
of the values and principles of both major component cultures. The first Director of the Institute, 
Judge Michael Brown, in consultation with the Institute’s Advisory Panel, accordingly initiated 
‘Te Matapunenga’121 which is an attempt to traverse the existing historical materials with a view 
to bringing together such references to tikanga Mäori customary concepts and institutions as ap-
peared to come from an influential or authoritative source and to exhibit explanatory insight. 
A commentary on tikanga Mäori custom, such as Te Matapunenga, could be incredibly valu-
able because it explains the roots and values of a custom, and shows how it has been applied and 
adapted over time. Tikanga Mäori customary law concepts can only be properly ascertained and 
applied by considering their historical context and evolution within a particular hapü (sub-tribe) or 
iwi (tribe) from ancient times through to the present. The challenge is to uncover and demonstrate 
that evolution. Accordingly, the researchers did not set out to determine what is or is not ‘true cus-
tom’, or authentic tikanga Mäori customary law but rather to record what has at various times and 
in various circumstances been claimed to be tikanga Mäori customary laws and institutions.
Te Mätähauariki researchers started with a list of tikanga Mäori terms, concepts, and institu-
tions found to be in use in historical and contemporary Mäori discourse selected with the assist-
ance of Kaumätua (Elders). The researchers searched a wide range of records for entries which 
are listed in chronological order under each title. Each entry consists of a sourced statement or 
explanation relevant to a particular title together with an explanatory preface intended to supply a 
context for the statement or explanation. The purpose of the context is to enable the reader to un-
derstand the circumstances in which the statement or explanation arose, and to judge its credibility 
and authority as highlighted by the late Lord Cooke of Thorndon: ‘In law, context is everything.’122 
To this end, the brief Te Matapunenga entry on ‘taonga’ discussed earlier looks like this:
Taonga:
A socially or culturally valuable technique, object, phenomenon or idea. In the phrase taonga tuku iho, 
taonga generally denotes tangible and, especially, intangible valuables (such as values, traditions and 
customs) handed down from antiquity. From Proto-Polynesian taonga, ‘treasured possession, especially 
a garment’. The application of the term to intangibles seems to have developed in Eastern Polynesia; 
for example, in Hawaiian the cognate word kaona denotes a hidden meaning, or an ambiguous word or 
phrase containing a concealed reference to a person or thing and whose use may have either a good or 
bad effect.
The Ngäti Porou lament ‘He Tangi Mo Taneuarangi’ contains a reference to ‘Te Kura a Mahina’, 
and Sir Apirana Ngata’s collection ‘Nga Moteatea’ explains the allusion, showing one way in 
which rights to taonga could be lost and gained, in this way: 
119 Above n 116 cases.
120 See the Te Mätähauariki Institute website available at http://www.lianz.waikato.ac.nz at November 2009.
121 R Benton, A Frame and P Meredith, ‘Te Matapunenga: A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institu-
tions of Maori Customary Law’ (Unpublished CD Version, Te Mätähauariki Research Institute, University of Waika-
to, 2007). It is anticipated that an updated version of Te Matapunenga will be published in 2010.
122 McGuire v Hastings District Council [2001] NZRMA 557, 1 November 2001, per Lord Cooke, 561.
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Te Kura a Mahina – nö te ünga mai o te Arawa i Hawaiki ka tae ki Ratanui, kei te takiwä o Tikirau, ka 
kitea atu te puäwai o te rata i uta, ka makaia ngá kura ki te moana; nga kura nei ko Tuhaepo, ko Tuhaeao. 
Ka pahemo te waka, ka kitea e Mahina i muri. Koia te whakataukï mö te mea kite: ‘He kura pae nä Mahi-
na käore e hoki atu tö taonga ki a koe’. [Translation in original source] The Plume of Mahina – on arrival 
from Hawaiki of the Arawa canoe at Ratanui, in the vicinity of Tikirau, the bloom of the Rata on shore 
was observed by the crew, and they thereupon threw their head plumes into the sea; the plumes were 
named Tuhaepo and Tuhaeao. After the canoes had moved on the plumes were discovered by Mahina. 
This gave rise to the proverbial saying about articles of value that are found: ‘A plume washed ashore for 
Mahina is a treasured thing which will not be returned to you’. Ngata & Jones 2004, pp 144-5, fn 19.
John White’s 1887 five-volume study of Mäori traditions related the account of Tainui’s crew 
throwing away their kura, or red ornaments, when they saw the plentiful red blossoms of the rata 
as they approached New Zealand. An important proverb, in effect the Mäori version of ‘finders 
keepers, losers weepers’, derives from this tradition: 
When the crew landed, Taininihi went to obtain some of the rata–blossom to wear as a head-dress in 
place of the kura he had brought from Hawaiki…He put the rata-blossoms as a plume on his head; but 
he had not thus worn them long when they began to fade. Then he was sorry for his Hawaiki kura which 
he had thrown into the sea, and he went in search of it along the sea-beach, but did not find it, as Mahia 
(or Mahina) had been there before him and found and taken it. When he heard that Mahia had found his 
kura he went to him to obtain it, but Mahia would not part with it. Taininihi asked again for it. Mahia an-
swered, ‘I will not give the kura to you, as it is a kura which has been floating in the sea, and was cast on 
the beach and found by me’. This is now a custom in regard to anything found, such as greenstone or any 
other thing. Translation in original. John White, The Ancient History of the Mäori, (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1887, Vol IV) p 32.
The missionary, Thomas Buddle came to New Zealand in May 1840. He was first stationed at 
Whaingaroa (Raglan). He was later directed to open a new mission on the Waipa River. Bud-
dle recorded in his diary a journey through the Waipa district and his interest in the area around 
Kakepuku as a suitable site for a mission station. Buddle noted that the local Mäori were anxious 
to have a missionary. He explained: 
But we have reason to suppose that their anxiety for a mission arises more from a desire to get trade or as 
they term it ‘taonga’. ‘Buddle, Thomas 1812-1883, Transcript of Diary, (13 Jun-ca 29 Dec 1840’, Entry 
for 30 october 1840. ATL Ref.MS-0343).
Professor Bruce Biggs has taken a language-oriented approach in his discussion of the meaning of 
taonga and other indigenous words used in the Mäori text of the Treaty of Waitangi.
The basic meaning of the Mäori word taonga is ‘valuable material possession’. Its Polynesian cognates 
tend to confine their meanings to specific types of highly valued woven garments, and a recent article 
[Weiner] has suggested that basically the Mäori word referred to ‘inalienable’ wealth, such as weapons 
and ornaments of greenstone and fine woven cloaks, which, even though they passed from one person 
to another, remained, in some sense, the property of the original owner. However that may be, the word 
taonga was used to refer to a wide range of valuable possessions and attributes, concrete or abstract…I 
have drawn thirty or so examples from early nineteenth century scriptural texts and found as referents 
to taonga, in addition to greenstone and woven articles, such other material assets as weapons and piec-
es of land; social and cultural features such as carving, dance, and (interestingly) warfare; personal at-
tributes such as attractive eyebrows. ... There can be no doubt that ‘o ratou taonga katoa’ can be taken, 
in strict accordance with language usage, to include all material and cultural possessions; the phrase in 
fact includes everything subsumed under the English ‘forests fisheries and other properties’ and more.’ 
‘Humpty Dumpty and the Treaty of Waitangi’ in Waitangi: Mäori and Päkehä Perspectives of the Treaty 
of Waitangi, I Hugh Kawharu (ed), (oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989) p 308.
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Annette B. Weiner shows how politically compelling inalienable possessions are, summarizing 
the underlying principles as follows:
Whatever the local cultural circumstances, constructing, guarding, altering and expanding social iden-
tities into forms of rank and hierarchy are dependent upon the success of institutionalizing difference 
through exchanges that demonstrate one’s ability to keep-while-giving. The ahistoric essentialism behind 
the traditional concept of the norm of reciprocity conceals the particular cultural configurations in and 
through which inalienable possessions are empowered to act as the source of difference and hierarchy.
She then turns to Mäori texts, following three main threads:
First, by pursuing Mauss’s interest in the hau, I trace the way the hau is embedded in a special class of 
valuables called taonga that are ranked according to their historical and cosmological antecedents. Sec-
ond, by reinterpreting classic Mäori ethnographic texts on the semantic meanings and spatial and histori-
cal movements of taonga, I expose the economic and political significance of flax and feather cloaks that, 
historically, are the oldest kinds of taonga…Third, since women are the producers of these cloaks, my 
ethnographic analysis of the hau and taonga brings women’s production as well as human and cultural 
reproduction into prominence. Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving, (Univer-
sity of California Press, Berkeley, 1992) pp 47-49.
Annette B Weiner has stimulated anthropologists to take an interest in a reinterpretation of the 
ethnographic data used in support of the norm of reciprocity by introducing the paradox of ‘keep-
ing-while-giving’ as a framework of analysis, thereby adding another dimension to the research-
ers’ understanding of hau, taonga and other important concepts:
Finally to return to the hau, we see that Ranapiri’s text is not enigmatic, nor is Mauss’s interpretation of 
the hau mystical. The hau as a life force embedded in the person is transmitted to the person’s posses-
sions. The ethnography shows that the hau must be given following birth and is lost through antisocial 
means or at death. The hau is permeable in that it must be replaced in people and things, instilling people 
with a creative force that creates a bond between them. However, the taonga and the hau are not identi-
cal because a taonga, as an inalienable possession carries the force of history and tradition. The hau of 
each owner enters the taonga, but the taonga’s value is based much less on personal identity than on 
the cumulative social and cosmological identities of past owners. Therefore, although the taonga is the 
vehicle of both the hau and history, these meanings are separable…The taonga given to someone should 
return because it is inalienable, but the hau can be detached from an object so that another taonga may 
carry the original ‘semblance’ of the person. When Ranapiri explains that when a taonga is given to 
another person, it will be repaid with another taonga, this is a replacement for the original. But when an 
exceptionally fine taonga is given, there is no replacement possible. Each high-ranking cloak or nephrite 
possession subjectively defines an exclusive set of social and cosmological relationships. To give away 
a taonga to someone else is to make that person an intimate part of these relationships. To claim another 
person’s taonga is more than a personal victory; it is to assume another’s rank, name, and history.’ Inal-
ienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1992) pp 64-65.
vii. some formaTive concLusions
Given the regrettable fact that Mäori represent a significant proportion of those involved in the 
criminal justice system, the case for greater Mäori input into the legal system is compelling. This 
article has highlighted a number of considerable advantages with acknowledging legal processes 
based on the first law of Aotearoa-New Zealand. It would give Mäori a legal system with which 
they are more likely to identify, accords with the Treaty principles of participation and partner-
ship, complies with Articles II and IV of the Mäori version of the Treaty, and contributes to a 
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genuine sense of cultural identity and social inclusion.123 The Treaty sought to encourage the in-
tegration and appropriate reconciliation of Mäori and English law, hence the partnership and the 
fiduciary duty established by the Treaty were and continue to be the lynch pins for constructing a 
polyphyletic future in the controversial relationship between affinity and difference in which both 
Mäori and Päkehä have parity of respect within the legal system of Aotearoa-New Zealand.
While tikanga Mäori customary law has now re-entered the legal system, there is evidence 
that the system may not yet have the tools, capacity, or to have developed a sufficiently informed 
approach to dealing appropriately with those customary laws. This article has briefly highlighted 
some of the complexities that the Courts are facing when attempting to incorporate tikanga Mäori 
customary law and to define the extent and scope of tikanga from legislation through case law.
A number of possibilities are available to Judges when deciding on the scope and extent of 
tikanga Mäori customary law including embracing te reo Mäori (language), mätauranga Mäori 
(world view, knowledge base) and tikanga Mäori themselves; the appropriate use of Kaumätua 
(Elders) as expert witnesses, and referring to authoritative and well audited works such as Te 
Matapunenga – a compendium of references to the concepts and institutions of Mäori customary 
law, which provides vital context to te reo Mäori, mätauranga Mäori and tikanga Mäori. There still 
appears to be a potential for the values and laws of the dominant society to be regularly applied in 
the assessment of proposals without a thought as to their origin but tikanga Mäori customary law 
is now restored as a part of the fabric of the legal system of Aotearoa-New Zealand.
The future of Aotearoa-New Zealand must lie in a single legal system which nevertheless 
recognises and respects the world views, values, customary laws and institutions of the two great 
founding cultures of this country, Mäori and British, as well as ‘others’ where appropriate. The 
existing legal framework must be modified thereby permitting the first law of this country, tikanga 
Mäori customary law, to operate effectively. Inaction is an expensive mistake. Education on the 
part of Mäori and Päkehä, as well as institutional flexibility, are key allies in the challenge to ap-
ply tikanga Mäori customary law. Greater understanding is likely to breed confidence. With edu-
cation, understanding, competence in both worlds, and confidence on the part of all participants, 
it may be possible to re-create and re-locate a significant space for the first law of Aotearoa-New 
Zealand within the legal system. But it will be a significant challenge to do so. Notwithstanding 
the challenge, Mäori, Päkehä and the legal system can rise to the occasion if political will, confi-
dence and competence from all involved exists.
Te rongonui o te taniko kei roto i te whiriwhiri noa mäu tonu töna ätaahua 
– The beauty of taniko (the embroided border of a fine woven cloak) is that there is more than one pattern.
123 Law Commission, Justice: The Experiences of Maori Women (NZLC R53, Wellington, 1999), 8.
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acronyms
AJHR Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, New Zealand.
APS Aborigines Protection Society.
BPP British Parliamentary Papers.
CN/o Church Missionary Society, Letters and Journals.
Co Colonial office Papers, Public Record office, London.
Col. Sec. Colonial Secretary in New Zealand, Secretary of State for the Colonies in England.
GBPD Great Britain Parliamentary Debates (Hansard, Third Series).
GBPP Great Britain Parliamentary Papers.
JPS Journal of the Polynesian Society.
MA Archives of the Mäori Affairs Department.
No Native office, correspondence of the Native Department.
NZLJ New Zealand Law Journal.
NZLR New Zealand Law Reports.
NZPD New Zealand Parliamentary Debates.
gLossary
Hapü Descent group with local base on a Marae, section of a tribe.
Hui Meeting.
Iwi Tribe or people.
Karakia Rights of incantation, prayer ritual.
Kaumätua Respected elder.
Kawa The protocol of the marae, rituals.
Kuia Elderly woman.
Mana Ascribed and achieved authority, prestige, spiritually endowed and maintained.
Marae Meeting place, village courtyard, spiritual symbolic centre of Mäori commu-
nity affairs.
Muru To take compensation in a formalised raid; to forgive.
Päkehä New Zealander of non-Mäori descent.
Rähui Customary embargo, restriction placed on resources often for conservation 
purposes.
Rangatira Chief – male and female, effective leader.
Rangatiratanga Chieftainship, authority.
Taniko Embroidered border, braid, tapestry of a precious cloak.
Taonga katoa All treasured possessions – precious objects, cultural norms, customs, values, 
institutions.
Tapu Sacred, forbidden, under spiritual or ceremonial restriction.
Tikanga ‘Right ways’, custom, from tika (adj.) straight, right, correct, fair, just.
Tohunga Expert.
Ture Law, authorised by Government, passed by formal legislature.
Utu Reciprocity, compensation, balance.
Wähi tapu Sacred places.
Whänau Extended family, usually four generations.
